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Executive Summary
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY SINCE THE 1990s
 l  Before the 1990s, the DPRK maintained the Soviet-style centrally planned economy 
(CPE), which served as a template for all communist regimes to varying degrees. The 
ruling Kim family siphoned resources to consolidate their rule while also moving the 
economic model into excessive militarisation thereby downgrading the CPE model. 
 l  The cessation of external aid in 1991 and adverse weather conditions triggered an 
economic collapse that descended into famine. The economic failure prompted 
spontaneous marketisation (‘involuntary transition’) out of the CPE in the 1990s. To 
cope with the emergency, the DPRK leadership at the time permitted branches of the 
party-state to establish trading companies.
 l  ‘Voluntary transition’ (reform from above) has been slow and protracted and despite 
the people’s heavy dependence on the market by the end of the 1990s, the regime 
only experimented briefly with market reforms (2002-2005) and then went into reverse 
gear (2005-2009).
 l  In 2012, Kim Jong-un announced the most far-reaching economic reforms in North 
Korea since 2002 followed by the launch of a National Economic Development Strategy 
(2016-2020) with significant reforms in agriculture, proto capitalism, property rights 
and stabilisation of the currency. However, North Korea remains a low-income economy 
due to foreign sanctions and a normalisation of relations with the US, in particular, may 
be essential to develop the North Korean economy with foreign direct investment. 
 l  The DPRK leadership looks to China’s economic advancements as a model for it to 
follow, albeit without developing too much of a dependency on China. The party will 
likely reaffirm rather than abandon the post-March 2018 “economic first” emphasis at 
its Eighth Congress in January 2021. 
NORTH KOREA DEVELOPMENT ALONG BORDER WITH CHINA
 l  Although it has been a traditionally secretive and closed state, North Korea cannot 
function without a certain amount of market activity, yet the regime is cautious of what 
it perceives as risks of economic activity that reaches outside the country’s borders. 
 l  The DPRK regime has prioritised the China border as a key area for economic development 
and North Korean border cities have been able to benefit from their proximity to China. 
Under Kim Jong-un, the DPRK continues to promote this model through plans and 
schemes, such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
 l  While sanctions from the West have had a debilitating impact on North Korean economic 
activity so too has the DPRK regime that despite economic reforms continues to 
prioritise its military and security systems.
 l  As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, North Korea’s shutdown of the border with China 
remains a massive structural change for the Kim Jong-un regime, and the DPRK will 
have to reopen its borders to support its SEZ economic development strategy.
NORTH KOREAN TOURISM
 l  Kim Jong-un has made tourism a key growth sector since he came to power in 2011. In 
2013, Pyongyang’s opening of its embassy in Madrid – home of the UN World Tourism 
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Organisation (UNWTO) – demonstrated the regime’s commitment to boosting their 
tourism sector, a sector that remains relatively free from restrictions. The Kim regime 
has been building programmes for training North Korean tourism professionals and 
seeks to learn sector expertise from the outside world.
 l  The tourism and hospitality sector in North Korea can generate cash without destabilising 
the regime as has been done in Myanmar, China and Vietnam. Experiments of inter-
Korean tourism have shown considerable promise and there is largely untapped demand 
from South Korean tourists on which the DPRK can focus.
 l  The DPRK has made significant advances in economic development schemes to 
support a tourism sector such as hotels, entertainment amenities, sports complexes 
and medical facilities (supporting ‘medical tourism’). The DPRK has recently launched 
several resorts.
 l  North Korea will continue to prioritise tourism as a growth engine once the COVID-19 
pandemic is over, however, it will have to transition from a closed nation-state to one 
that is more open.
NORTH KOREAN HEALTH SYSTEM
 l  North Korea has had a history of free universal healthcare to its citizens, yet access and 
quality of care are somewhat dependent on a patient’s wealth. North Korea has been 
dependent on outside NGOs to assist with healthcare and the case of how tuberculosis 
is treated is a case in point. 
 l  The healthcare system has been impacted by the sanctions and only aid, which prevents 
immediate loss of life, is exempt from restrictions, yet it is becoming a key element of 
the internal economy and reinforces existing hierarchies.
 l  Kim Jong-un has identified the healthcare sector one of the government’s top priorities 
with a commitment to modernise pharmaceutical and medical device factories and 
refurbish hospitals and clinics.
 l  Rebuilding the economy will require having a functioning health system as this is crucial 
to having a healthy labour force of the manual and heavy labour on which the economy 
currently depends. The effects of the famines in North Korea during the 1990s, which 
invoked lingering effects such as stunted growth, show the importance that healthcare 
has in the future North Korean economy.
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1. Introduction – Reconstructing North Korea
by Craig Tiedman
Director of Policy & Research, Henry Jackson Society 
In 2018, the Henry Jackson Society began a four-phase research project to examine opportunities 
and challenges for reconstructing North Korea within a scenario characterised by normalised 
political and diplomatic relations with liberal democracies and the liberal opening of the North 
Korean economy. The scenario seemed possible to many Korea analysts at the time given 
the renewed ‘Sunshine Policy’ of the South Korean leadership in 2017, and the 2018 and 2019 
Trump-Kim summits reflecting an optimistically positive direction in North-South relations. 
Background 
In the aftermath of World War II and competition between liberal democratic powers and 
communist powers, Korea was divided into two zones with North Korea occupied by the 
Soviet Union, and South Korea occupied by the United States. Efforts to unify the two sides 
failed and in 1948 two separate governments formed: a socialist Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the capitalist Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south. Shortly 
after the division, North Korea invaded South Korea resulting in the Korean War from 1950 to 
1953 during which China became engaged militarily in the conflict on behalf of the DPRK. In 
1953, a truce interrupted the war, but no peace agreement was ever signed and technically the 
Korean War still exists today. 
The national trajectories of the two countries divided by the 38th parallel could not be more 
different. The Kim family had effectively taken control of the leadership rights in the DPRK 
establishing the government as a hereditary dictatorship with the backing of China, whilst South 
Korea has taken the path of a democratic republic with a presidential system of government 
with the backing of the United States. The economies reflect the system of government with 
North Korea continuing to survive as a closed planned economy and South Korea thriving as 
an open market economy. By 2019, the ROK’s nominal GDP was 54 times greater than that of 
DPRK. 1 The DPRK, however, has continued to build its military since its founding and has the 
4th largest army in the world today. In 2005, the DPRK claimed to have developed nuclear 
weapons and through a series of tests since has confirmed its claim. The United States and its 
allies have applied diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions to convince the DPRK to stop 
building nuclear capabilities and weapons and delivery systems, while the DPRK continues to 
build its capabilities in missile technology. 
Recent Events 
In early 2017 North Korea conducted a series of missile tests, including firing missiles that 
landed close to the coast of Japan, leading to arguably the highest level of tensions among its 
neighbours and the United States since the Korean War fighting in the 1950s. Newly elected US 
President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged heated words and threats 
through the media leading to a crisis of escalating threats through the first half of the year. 
South Koreans elected Moon Jae-in as president in May 2017, who had campaigned under the 
promise of a return to the ‘Sunshine Policy’ – a throwback to the late 1990s when the South 
Korean President Kim Dae-jung (who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts of 
1  Yoon, J.S. (2020). ‘GDP comparison between South Korea and North Korea 2010-2019’, in Statistica, September 1, 2020.  
Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1035390/south-korea-gdp-comparison-with-north-korea/#:~:text=In%20
2019%2C%20South%20Korea’s%20nominal,than%20that%20of%20North%20Korea.
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conciliation with the DPRK) promoted a policy of taking a softer approach to North Korea and 
helping its northern neighbour rebuild its economy. President Moon’s version – now referred 
to as the ‘Moonshine Policy’ – continues to promote establishing positive relations with North 
Korea. The Moon government reached out to the DPRK and in an unexpected diplomatic 
turn of events, the DPRK sent a delegation to South Korea for the Winter Olympic Games in 
February 2018. A historic meeting followed two months later between President Moon Jae-in 
and Chairman Kim Jong-un at the DMZ in April of 2018.
As a result of the momentum of President Moon Jae-in’s initiatives with the DPRK leadership, 
the President of the United States Donald Trump met directly with the DPRK’s Chairman 
Kim Jong-un in June 2018 for a historic summit in Singapore. The two countries signed an 
agreement endorsing the 2017 Panmunjom Declaration between North and South Korea 
pledging to work towards denuclearising the Korean Peninsula. At a joint press conference 
in September 2018, President Moon and Chairman Kim further endorsed the idea of a 
denuclearised Korean Peninsula. 
Progress between the United States and North Korea has become largely symbolic and 
despite a February 2019 meeting in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim, no 
further agreements were reached. In June 2019, the two leaders met for a final time, joined by 
President Moon Jae-in at the DMZ.
Reconstructing North Korea – The Research Project 
In 2019, the Korea Foundation sponsored the next phase of the research enabling HJS 
researchers and the four external contributors to examine particular areas of DPRK’s sectors 
where reconstruction might have the most success in the initial stages. The research direction 
was then influenced by a roundtable in London in November of 2019 and the researchers have 
contributed by each focusing on a specific area of North Korea economic history along the 
following themes:
 l Tentative Foundations of Economic Recovery: North Korea in the 2010s
 l North Korea’s Northern Tier: Economic Potential and Blockages
 l North Korean Healthcare and its importance in rebuilding the economy
 l Tourism: Low-hanging fruit for economic growth
The following chapters by Dr Kong, Mr Cathcart, Dr Jones and Dr Pacheco Pardo offer a 
glimpse into important elements to consider in the hypothetical reconstruction of North 
Korea. In the last quarter of 2020, each of the contributors revised their chapters to reflect 
the changes in the global economic and political environments largely due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The DPRK has predictably closed its borders again (including increased restrictions 
on the Chinese border) and Kim Jong-un claims to have contained the COVID-19 virus from 
spreading internally. Whether or not the North Korean economy can survive this global shock 
or not remains to be seen. 
While North Korea may have fallen off the international community’s radar due to the 
understandable distractions that the COVID-19 pandemic presented, the DPRK is likely to be a 
problem that cannot be ignored in 2021. 
As an editor, it has been a pleasure to work with all of those who have contributed to this 
study and I appreciate their creative flexibility in updating their contributions in light of the 
‘black swan event’ that the pandemic has become, an event that has severely affected global 
economies – including the economy of North Korea.
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2. Tentative Foundations of Economic Recovery: North Korea in the 2010s
by Dr Tat Yan Kong
Reader, the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS) University of London 
Involuntary transition c. 1991–2011 
The Soviet-style centrally planned economy (CPE) has served as the basic template for all 
communist regimes. Less industrialised CPEs outside of the Soviet bloc (notably China, 
Vietnam and Cuba), however, were much less sophisticated in their planning. This lack of 
sophistication (especially in China and Vietnam) would later facilitate the market transition 
as reformers were not confronted with such powerful vested interests dependent on the CPE. 
As the most urbanised of the non-Soviet bloc economies, North Korea’s organisation came 
closest to the CPE. Compared to the Soviet bloc, however, it was far less efficient, given its 
lower level of technical sophistication and politically driven distortions (especially its excessive 
militarisation and the siphoning of resources by the Supreme Leader to consolidate hereditary 
rule). Consequently, the CPE became degraded. Typical CPE problems (inaccurate data, 
shortage of inputs, weak incentives, low productivity) were manifested in exaggerated form 
in North Korea. The cessation of external aid in 1991, followed by adverse weather conditions, 
triggered a collapse that descended into famine.
Economic collapse prompted spontaneous marketisation or involuntary transition out of the 
CPE in the 1990s. To cope with the emergency, the leadership permitted branches of the 
party-state to establish trading companies. Those branches most important to the survival 
of the regime (notably the military) acquired the most valuable economic assets (mainly 
minerals and case crops). From these assets, they would sustain themselves while contributing 
‘revolutionary funds’ to the centre.
Nominally remaining under the central plan, the non-privileged enterprises (and farms) of the 
CPE also had to sustain themselves (since centrally provided inputs and rations had collapsed 
except for essential sectors such as munitions) while making use of less profitable assets. In 
the process, all official entities (be they party-state or ordinary CPE economic units) came to 
depend on enterprising non-state individuals, especially those who functioned as merchants 
or money lenders, or who had links with China.
In contrast to spontaneous marketisation, however, voluntary transition (reform ‘from above’) 
has been slow and protracted. Despite the people’s heavy dependence on the market by the 
end of the 1990s, 2 the regime only experimented briefly with market reforms (2002–5) 3 and 
then went into reverse gear (2005–9). Marketisation raised some serious dilemmas for the 
regime. For example, profit-seeking was beginning to weaken the discipline of branches of the 
party-state (notably the military). Ideologically not very committed to marketisation anyway, 
Kim Jong-Il attempted to turn the clock back and launched an anti-market campaign from 
2005 to 2009 that culminated in a currency revaluation (aimed at wiping out accumulated 
profits). However, the attempt met resistance at the elite level, especially from the military, 
and also at the grassroots level (including in the capital Pyongyang) because it disrupted the 
market provision of basic consumer goods without adequate replacement from the state.
2  The informal market sector supplied “60 per cent of food grains and 70 per cent of consumer necessities in the mid-1990s”. 
See Lim, Soo-Ho (2009). The Rise of Markets Within a Planned Economy (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 
2009), p.113.
3  These reforms are notable for allowing many official prices and wages to follow their market levels and the introduction of 
official markets.
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From involuntary transition to tentative ‘reform from above’ c. 2011–present 
Under the leadership of Kim Jong-un (2011–present), the North Korean regime appears to have 
chosen the path of economic reform. The theme of economic development was prominent in 
Kim Jong-un’s public pledge never to repeat austerity (in his first speech as Supreme Leader 
in 2012). The reforms announced in 2012 (6.28 reforms) and 2014 (5.30 reforms) 4 were the 
most far-reaching since 2002. In contrast to the 2000s, there has been no reverse course. At 
the seventh Party Congress of May 2016, Kim Jong-un even mapped out a National Economic 
Development Strategy (2016–20). At the third plenum of the Central Committee (of the 
seventh Party Congress) in April 2018, Kim announced a major change of strategic course 
from ‘parallel advance’ (of nuclear defence and economic development) to ‘economy first’. 
Some developments of the 2010s are worth highlighting: 
1. Agriculture
The most pressing economic issue for North Korea is food shortage. The 6.28 and 5.30 reforms 
incentivised farmers by allowing them to keep a greater share of their product. North Korea 
did not achieve China’s spectacular results (quadrupling of output between 1979 and 1984) 
because its agriculture was more chemical-intensive. Nevertheless, domestic food output has 
been gradually recovering since the famine (despite the cessation of South Korean fertiliser 
aid since 2010). 5 In 2018, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World 
Food Programme (FAO/WFP) projected a production level of 4.2 million metric tonnes against 
a consumption ‘food use’ of 4.5 million metric tonnes. 6 
2. Proto-capitalism and property rights
While retaining formal state ownership, the measures opened up further opportunities for 
non-state agents (i.e. entrepreneurs, merchants and financiers). The collaboration between 
these non-state agents and state entities constitutes a form of proto-capitalism (for-profit 
activities under nominal state ownership). ‘Marketisation from above’ has opened up bigger 
opportunities for non-state agents in key social infrastructural projects (including apartment 
construction in Pyongyang) and in state-promoted consumption activities such as retail 
and entertainment facilities. Although ‘property rights’ do not yet exist in the formal sense, 
they appear to be secure enough for non-state agents to risk their money on large-scale 
collaborations with state entities.
3. Stabilisation of the currency
Since 2013, the authorities have pegged the North Korean won to the US dollar. Having previously 
abandoned the local currency in favour of hard currencies, North Korean citizens once again 
started using local currency (although hard currencies predominate when it comes to larger 
transactions). The introduction of the dollar-peg means that the authorities were no longer 
prepared to accept hyper-inflation, a typical consequence of unaffordable subsidisation under 
communism. The implication is that state sector economic activity is governed by a capitalist 
logic, i.e. the imperative to earn hard currency or dollar-pegged won in order to survive. 7
4  These reforms are notable for enhanced autonomy for farms and industrial enterprises in their transactions (market sourcing 
and distribution) and the introduction of a more favourable revenue sharing formula.
5  The figures for the production of edible crops (million metric tonnes) are: 3.49 (1997); 4.13 (2002); 4.01 (2007); 4.67 (2012); 
4.82 (2016) and 4.70 (2017). Unless stated otherwise, all data are derived from Statistics Korea, Major Statistics of North Korea 
(Seoul: KOSTAT, several issues).
6  FAO/WFP, Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea (DPRK): FAO/WFP Joint Rapid Food Security Assessment, May 2019, 
available at: https://www.wfp.org/publications/democratic-peoples-republic-korea-dprk-faowfp-joint-rapid-food-security-
assessment, last visited: 11 December 2020, p.25.
7  Suk, L., ‘Overview: growth, dollarization and the emergence of a dual economy’ in Lee, Suk (ed.), 2016: The DRPK Economic 
Outlook (Korea Development Institute, Sejong City, 2017), pp.22-30.
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Persisting weaknesses in the economic structure 
Per capita income levels have been recovering since the famine of the 1990s, but stand at about 
US$1,450 per year (although in privileged Pyongyang, it is well over US$2,000). According to 
World Bank criteria, North Korea straddles the low-income (US$1,205) and low-middle-income 
(US$1,026–3,995) categories. North Korea’s life expectancies (73.1 for women and 66.3 for men 
in 2017) are very close to the low-income country estimates of the World Health Organization 
(73 for women, 68 for men in 2012). Owing to its history of distorted development and crisis, 
North Korea is a low-income economy that is at the same time highly urbanised. To achieve 
economic take-off, North Korea will need to become an exporter of light manufacturing (such 
as textiles). The experience of the rest of East Asia has already shown that this path facilitates 
high growth and equity (through employment generation) in the early stages of development. 
The experiences of Kaesong, 8 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and migrant labour 
indicate that North Korea has good potential when it comes to light manufacturing. The 
labour is relatively cheap, well-educated and disciplined. The initial rise of China as an export 
economy was driven by attracting FDI into its special economic zones (SEZs), especially in the 
Pearl River Delta. The current North Korean regime has demonstrated its interest in FDI. In its 
designation of 13 new Economic Development Zones (EDZs) in November 2013, it was more 
ambitious than its predecessors. EDZs were designated throughout the country (Figure 1). 
However, for the EDZs to become functional, as well as for North Korea to exploit its potential 
in other promising sectors (especially raw materials and tourism), it will have to overcome 
some serious external and domestic constraints.
8  Kaesong was a South Korean invested enclave in the North that was closed in 2016 by the South Korean Government (in 
response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test).
Figure 1
Source: Kim, Bo-geun, ‘In economic development, will North Korea choose South Korea or China?’, Hangyoreh, 19 February 2014.
1. Sanctions
Before it can take any major step forward, North Korea will need some easing of the sanctions 
regime (both international and unilateral US ones). Rather than the much-disputed GDP growth 
rate, the level of trade is often taken as an indicator of the health of the North Korean economy. 
Figure 2 indicates how recent sanctions have taken their toll on North Korean exports.
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The contraction of exports has taken the level of total trade almost back to the late 2000s. 
However, the volume of imports has contracted far less. This suggests that China is allowing 
North Korea to run deficits to sustain its imports (especially food and limited amounts of oil). 
The absence of reference to the National Economic Development Strategy (2016–20) at the 
recent fifth plenum of the seventh Central Committee suggests that the plan is off-course.
2. Relations with the US
To attract FDI on any significant scale, North Korea needs to normalise diplomatic relations 
with the US. However, progress has stalled despite summits in Singapore (June 2018) and 
Hanoi (February 2019) and the mini summit in Panmunjom (June 2019). North Korea and the 
US are deadlocked over the terms of denuclearisation. Both sides have become entrenched 
in their respective positions (Washington’s ‘package deal’ versus Pyongyang’s ‘phased and 
synchronous’ denuclearisation). Working level talks went nowhere and North Korea set 31 
December 2019 as the deadline for the expiry of negotiations with the US.
3. Infrastructure bottlenecks
North Korea’s road capacity is very limited. In 2017, it was 26,178 kilometres, similar to South 
Korea’s 1965 level (28,145 kilometres). Its railway network is extensive in mileage terms 9 but 
is in need of modernisation. Energy supply is inadequate. Blackouts are commonplace, even 
in Pyongyang. In 2017, North Korea generated less electricity than it did in 1990 (the last 
year it received subsidised Soviet/Russian oil). This was less than 25 percent of the South’s 
generation in 1990, when the South was an upper-middle-income economy. 10 
Figure 2
Source: Statistics Korea, Major Statistics of North Korea (Seoul: KOSTAT, several issues).
9  In 2017, it was 5,287 kilometres, exceeding South Korea’s 4,078 kilometres.
10  The figures are (in 100 million kwh): 277 (1990); 193 (1997); 190 (2002); 236 (2007); 215 (2012); 239 (2016); and 235 (2017). 
South Korea’s power generation in 1990 was already 1077.
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The prospects 
The market became the dominant form of economic coordination in the 1990s. The rise of 
transactions using hard currencies, and the subsequent pegging of the won to the dollar in 
2013, means that state sector enterprises must also work according to market principles (since 
they cannot rely on inflationary financing). The monolithic political system under Kim Jong-un 
has cautiously facilitated marketisation over the past decade. The Supreme Leader has used his 
authority to redefine the economic ideology and assert greater control over vested economic 
interests built up under his predecessor (especially the military and branches of the ruling party). 
China appears to be an influential role model and is now less alien to North Korea than in the 
1990s-2000s. Enabled by advances in cyber technology, the Xi administration is simultaneously 
striving for economic modernisation, improvement of governance and political centralisation. 
This combination corresponds to the type of ruling formula Kim Jong-un is looking for. 
Historically, North Korea has preferred diversification to stable dependence on China. Pyongyang 
chose to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to draw the US into negotiations. If 
North Korea can normalise relations with the US and attract generous FDI inflow, then it has the 
potential to follow the export-led model of industrialisation in which it has shown interest. With 
the deadline for negotiation with the US having expired, however, the best economic pathway 
is off the table for now. Instead of Kim Jong-un’s traditional New Year speech, the authorities 
released the report of the fifth Plenum of the Central Committee that concluded on 31 December 
2019. 11 The report exhorted party leaders at all levels to achieve a “frontal breakthrough” in the 
economic struggle against the sanctions. For now, North Korea is focused on weathering the 
current pressure of sanctions (with a discrete helping hand from China). Ominously, the report 
also announced the development of “new strategic weapons”, presumably referring to the 
engine testing of the gigantic new ICBM paraded for the first time on 10 October 2020.
Added to the failure to ease sanctions by making a breakthrough in relations with the US, 
North Korean economy has been further blighted by natural disasters and the protracted 
COVID pandemic during 2020. Concern about the pandemic has also forced the Pyongyang 
authorities to restrict economic contacts with China that had previously eased the pain of 
sanctions. In the words of one Chinese professor, it has had to re-emphasize “self-reliance” 
once more. 12 This was reflected in the launch of the “80-day campaign” on 5 October 2020 
to complete 200 economic goals ahead of the Eighth Congress scheduled for January 2021. 13 
Such a campaign was a throwback to the voluntarist methods of his grandfather and father 
(when top-down economic plans often failed). At the 75th anniversary commemoration 
(10 October 2020) of the party’s founding, Kim himself went as far as to admit publicly 
to his own shortcomings in the efforts to improve the country. On the external front, a 
domestically-focused Biden administration is unlikely to repeat the bold diplomatic gestures 
of the mercurial Trump. 
The relative frankness with which the leadership talks about the economy suggests that it has 
not given up on its aspirations for economic development despite the adverse developments 
mentioned above. Here the crucial variable is China. While total North Korean exports dropped 
to USD 260 in 2019, it was able to import USD 2.68 billions worth of goods, almost 10-fold. Of 
North Korea’s total trade, China accounted for 95.2 percent in 2019. 14 This deficit suggests that 
11  Je-Hun, L., Ji-Won, N. and Joon-Bum, H., ‘[News analysis] Kim Jong-Un’s message of self-reliance and “foiling” sanctions 
during last party meeting of 2019’, Hankyoreh, 2 January 2020, available at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/ 
e_northkorea/922940.html, last visited: 11 December 2020.
12  Jingyi Jin, “[Column] North Korea’s ‘self-reliance’ amid the novel corona pandemic”, Hankyoreh, 23 March 2020.
13  Je-hun Lee, “Kim Jong-Un declares ’80-day campaign’ for economic success at WPK congress”, Hankyoreh, 7 October 2020.
14  Kye-wan Cho, “North Korea’s trade dependence climbs to 95 percent, report show”, Hankyoreh, 17 May 2020.
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at the very least Beijing is doing enough to ensure the survival of the North Korean economy. 
Difficult relations with the West (China’s perception of US-led encirclement, North Korean 
frustrations over sanctions) are pushing the two regimes to further emphasize their shared 
history and political credentials. This was indicated by the recent “diplomacy by letters” or six 
exchanges of personal communication between Kim Jong-Un and Xi Jinping in September-
October 2020. 15 
Another sign was the publicity with China given to the 70th anniversary of China’s entry 
into the Korean War on 19 October 1950. These gestures suggested the likely renewal of the 
mutual defence treaty in 2021 (first concluded 1961 and renewed every 20 years). Economic 
exchanges are also expected to pick up as the COVID pandemic increasingly comes under 
control (perhaps China will make its mass vaccine available to North Korea). Although not the 
ideal path of diplomatic and economic diversification, North Korea will receive much needed 
political and economic cushioning (so long as it does not cross Beijing’s red line of nuclear 
testing). As such, it is likely that the party will reaffirm rather than abandon the post-March 
2018 “economic first” emphasis at its Eighth Congress in January 2021.
15  Je-hun Lee, “[News analysis] “North Korea, China ramp up their ‘letter diplomacy’ ahead of US presidential election”, 
Hankyoreh, 30 October 2020.
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3. North Korea’s Northern Tier: Economic Potential and Blockages
By Adam Cathcart
Lecturer in Chinese History, University of Leeds 
It has become a commonplace observation that North Korea is a secretive state whose opacity 
serves as a defensive measure against external challengers and as a means of keeping its 
population quiescent. 16 Regime security takes precedence over the limited openness that 
might be generated by an increase in external trade. 17 Even as the regime touts the image of 
increased living standards in North Korean cities, the population remains tied to requirements 
for uncompensated hard labour and mobilisation rooted in wartime practices. 18 The state now 
cannot function without a certain measure of market activity, but when economic activity 
reaches outside of the national borders it can be problematic. 
When it comes to the northern border region with China, North Korean leaders squarely face 
this dilemma. North Korea must balance the cross-border flow of workers, entrepreneurs and 
officials into and through China with the harder edges of border controls and restrictions. The 
DPRK’s recent response to the COVID-19 outbreak in China highlighted this further, resulting 
in a full shutdown of the border and extensive quarantine protocols, including for foreign 
diplomats (including, presumably, the Chinese ambassador). 19 In the short term, cutting off 
supplies from China has resulted in price inflation domestically, which is a tolerable price to 
pay to protect North Korea’s already-besieged health system from potential collapse. 20 
In spite of the general tendency toward secrecy and security, when the regime wishes to make 
an achievement or policy impetus known, it does so by releasing a relatively large amount of 
data. This has been the case with Kim Jong-un’s drive to develop the northern tier of cities 
– Sinuiju, Manp’o, Kanggye, Samjiyeon, Hyesan, Hyeryong and Rason – in regions bordering 
China. 
The northwest has been the privileged and most dense area of economic interaction with 
China, via the city of Sinuiju and its burgeoning Chinese counterpart of Dandong. This has been 
the centre of both commercial and diplomatic flows between Korea and China dating back 
to the dynastic era, although the infrastructure along the border is decidedly dated from the 
Japanese colonial era. North Korean-run businesses have been set up in Dandong and environs, 
North Korean workers peopled Chinese enterprises in such areas as textiles and electronics 
assembly, and Dandong has been the destination for shopping and luxury excursions by North 
Korean elites. 21 It also has a relatively flourishing trade in artistic commodities exported from 
North Korea or created by North Korean artists residing in China. 
16  Lankov, A., Kwak, I. and Cho, C., ‘The Organizational Life: Daily Surveillance and Daily Resistance in North Korea’, Journal 
of East Asian Studies 12 (2012), pp.193-214; Green, C., ‘Wrapped in a Fog: The DPRK Constitution and the Ten Principles’ 
in Cathcart, A., Green, C. and Winstanley-Chesters, R. (eds), Change and Continuity in North Korean Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2016), pp.23-38.
17  External trade under certain conditions is of course sought by the regime, but trade intended to encourage economic reform 
can also lead to strengthening the country’s WMD programmes. See Kong, T.Y., ‘China’s engagement-oriented strategy 
towards North Korea: achievements and limitations’, The Pacific Review Vol. 31 (1) (January 2018), pp.76-95.
18 Smith, H., North Korea: Markets and Military Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.106.
19  Cathcart, A., ‘How the coronavirus is being dealt with on the other side of the Tumen river’, NK News, 18 February 2020, 
available at: https://www.nknews.org/2020/02/how-the-coronavirus-is-being-dealt-with-on-the-other-side-of-the-tumen-
river/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
20  Silberstein, B.K., ‘How the coronavirus may impact the North Korean economy’ NK Economy Watch, 18 February 2020, 
available at: https://www.nkeconwatch.com/2020/02/13/how-can-the-coronavirus-impact-the-north-korean-economy/, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
21  Chilcote, C., ‘Bridges of Ambition to North Korea: Economy of Anticipation and Materiality of Aspiration in Dandong, China,’ 
Critical Sociology, 44(3) (May 2017), pp.437–453.
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22  ‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Master Plan for Construction of Sinuiju’, Rodong Sinmun, 18 November 2018, available 
at: http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2018-11-16-0012, last visited: 11 December 2020. 
For analysis, see Silberstein, B.J., ‘Kim Jong Un oversees master plan for Sinuiju’s facelift and construction,’ NK Economy 
Watch, 5 December 2018, available at: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2018/12/05/kim-jong-un-oversees-master-plan-for-
sinuiju-facelift-and-construction/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
23  Cathcart, A., ‘Evaded States: Security and Control in the Sino-Korean Border Region’ in Horstmann, A., Saxer, M. and Rippa, 
A. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands (London: Routledge, 2018), pp.422-433.
24  Park, J.S., ‘Korea’s Regional Relations’, remarks at the Korea Society, New York City, 5 December 2019.
25  Clement, T., ‘Recent Developments on the SEZ Battlefront: Mubong and Kyongwon,’ Sino-NK, 9 November 2015, 
available at: https://sinonk.com/2015/11/09/recent-developments-on-the-sez-battlefront-mubong-and-kyongwon/, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
Kim Jong-un looked set to elevate Sinuiju’s international profile with a sweeping visit to the 
city in November 2018, during which he declared an overhaul of the city’s architecture, and 
updates of the waterfront and transport infrastructure. 22 The plan did not address in even a 
peripheral way the role of cross-border trade in Sinuiju’s economic life. Most of all, it did not 
incorporate the completion of a road spur to a long-completed (and very expensive) bridge 
from the Chinese side to the outskirts of Sinuiju. However, Kim Jong-un’s subsequent stopover 
in Dandong on his way to meet Xi Jinping in January 2019 left further room for talks with city 
and provincial leaders in Dandong and China’s Liaoning province. 
Sanctions levied in 2016 and 2017 put a squeeze on many of these activities, as did the arrest 
for corruption on the Chinese side of one of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) top 
business supporters of trade with North Korea, Ma Xiaohong of the Hongxiang firm. Chinese 
participation in the ostensible reconstruction of Sinuiju appears to be minimal. The status of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) near Sinuiju are, like many things in North Korea, a case study 
of big plans without successful follow through. The SEZs in Hwanggumpyeong and Wihwa 
Islands were to have been jointly managed with the PRC, but the purge and execution of the 
Supreme Leader’s allegedly perfidious uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013 effectively 
appears to have placed these on hold for the last six years, and no construction, let alone a 
shared legal framework, has been undertaken.
Much further up the Yalu River is Hyesan. This city is today best known in the West as the 
hometown of female defectors Yeonmi Park and Hyeonseo Lee, both of whom have written 
best-selling memoirs. For North Korea, the city has been important since the late 1960s as an 
ideological symbol for Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla heritage, but it is largely run down with many 
unpaved streets and a notorious smuggling scene. 23 Curiously, Kim Jong-un has chosen to do 
far less public work for this city – presumably his security detail finds it far too dangerous and 
exposed to bluffs on the Chinese side of the border – and instead has placed his hopes and his 
resources in Samjiyeon, a resort further inland but still at the foot of Mount Paektu. 
For Kim Jong-un, Samjiyeon appears to be a more pristine canvas for his dreams of a new 
revolutionary elite, as well as holding potential for an inflow of Chinese tourists. One American 
analyst, however, sees the building up of Samjiyeon as having less to do with economics and 
tourism and more to do with regime security – given some deep underground bunkers, it 
would make an ideal spot through which to weather an attack on North Korea from US or 
South Korean forces. It is close enough to the Chinese border to keep US missiles away, and 
has the further advantage of having been the site which Kim Jong-un visited when he was 
plotting the overthrow and purge of his uncle Jang Song-thaek. 24 
North Korea’s own politics can thus hold back SEZ development just as international sanctions 
can. In the case of the extreme northeast of the DPRK, the Kyongwon SEZ appears to have 
gone nowhere, with no meaningful construction since its emergence as a potential twin for 
China’s hub of Hunchun in the tri-border region with Russia. 25 Since Hunchun has served 
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as a magnet for North Korean seafood processing as well as coal – two areas specifically 
targeted in UN sanctions – it may be that sanctions as well as internal pressures are keeping 
development moves slender to non-existent across from Hunchun. It would be more likely 
to see North Korean workers return to Hunchun itself, where various South Korean firms are 
already operating, although if the Kaesong Industrial Complex is not operating, it is unlikely 
that we will see South Korean managers working with North Korean employees on a shop floor 
in Northeast China.
Finally, Rason has long been North Korea’s example of an institutionally rooted SEZ. Unlike 
the failed ventures near Dandong, the plug has never been pulled on Rason (an amalgam of 
Rajin-Sonbong) since its inception in the early 1990s. Here the DPRK can also balance Chinese 
investment with that from other states like Russia and Thailand. Rason would also play a key 
role if and when trade with Japan, North Korea’s top non-communist trade partner in the 
1980s, revives. However, as an in-depth look at Rason’s history would indicate, while the DPRK 
has made progress in making its investment laws more flexible, in essence very little has been 
done to merit anything like the prognostications of a ‘North Korean Hong Kong’ from the early 
1990s. International alignments and UN development regimes today seem less likely to lift 
Rason up as the possible hub for a new or rebooted Greater Tumen Initiative than they were 
in that era. 
These cities across the northern tier are themselves not at all well laterally linked. While Kim 
Jong-un has pressed for improvements in transport across the northern region, he is operating 
against a massive amount of failure and long work stoppages dating back to 1980 and his 
grandfather’s original rant against “chairmen and ministers who sit with folded arms” in the 
railways sector in the provinces bordering China. 26 Like the basic problem of connecting its 
east coast and west coast fishing fleets, east–west rail connections have long been a problem 
for the DPRK. However, in the regions near China, Kim Jong-un succeeded in opening a new 
rail line from Hyesan to Samjiyeon in 2018, to much fanfare. But the border region cities in 
the north of the DPRK do not in themselves form a coherent ‘region’ as such, and still less 
can the region put forward anything like an internal lobby within North Korea’s Pyongyang-
centred politics. But China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ still beckons for interaction, and China’s 
infrastructure along the frontier with the DPRK means the channels are there for an exponential 
increase in trade from and with North Korea. 27 
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, North Korea’s shutdown of the border with China 
remains a massive structural change for the Kim Jong-un regime. In a way that can only be 
likened to his grandfather’s reliance on Chinese military aid in the Korean War and the five 
years of intensive labour assistance from Chinese forces thereafter, the young Kim has relied 
upon economic interaction with China to keep elites placated and the population supplied 
with consumer goods. As the interaction between North Korea and China slows to a crawl, 
harsher political controls are being put in place in the DPRK, and the outlook for an economic 
boom in the border region with China has been put on hold.
26  Kim Il Sung, ‘Speech to Senior Officials of the Administration Council’, 5 March 1980 (Works, vol. 35, p.15). For discussion of 
the need for more lateral transport across the northern tier, see Kim Il Sung, ‘Speech at a Consultative Meeting of Economic 
Officials of Chongjin and North Hamgyong Province’, 28 July 1980 (Works, vol. 35, p.222), in which the primary need cited 
for improved rail across the north is to move coal to factories closer to Pyongyang, rather than people placing ‘strain’ on 
transport networks as they move around in search of food.
27  On North Korea’s rejection of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, see Cathcart, A. and Green, C., ‘Xi’s Belt: Chinese–North Korean 
Relations’ in Boon, H.T. (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi (London: Routledge, 2018), pp.130-143. On China’s failure to 
sell the BRI to a rather more economically robust set of Koreans, see Lee, M. and Hao, Y., ‘China’s Unsuccessful Charm 
Offensive: How South Koreans have Viewed the Rise of China Over the Past Decade’, Journal of Contemporary China, 
27:114 (2018), pp.867-886.
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4. Tourism: Low-Hanging Fruit for Economic Growth
By Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Lecturer, The School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
Introduction: Kim’s long-term plan 
Kim Jong-un came to power in December 2011. He announced a new byungjin or parallel 
development line in March 2013. The focus would be on the development of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons programme and its economy. Pyongyang opened its embassy in Madrid 
shortly after, in October 2013. The Spanish capital hosts the UN’s World Tourism Organisation 
(UNWTO). This is the key UN agency helping countries across the world to develop their 
tourism sector.
This chain of events, even if oversimplified, shows that tourism has been at the heart of Kim’s 
economic development strategy since he took power. As then-Ambassador to Spain Kim Hyok-
chol stated in February 2014, shortly after his appointment, the presence of UNWTO in Spain 
was one of the main reasons why Pyongyang was interested in having an embassy in Madrid. 28 
The tourism sector had been booming in East Asia for years when Kim came to power. North 
Korea, however, seemed to have been left behind. Kim wanted to redress the situation.
The prioritisation of the tourism sector has only accelerated in recent years as the UN and the 
US have tightened sanctions. As a 2019 report by South Korea-based think tank Korea Institute 
for National Unification has indicated, Kim now sees tourism not only as a pillar of long-term 
economic growth – but also as one of the few sectors that can provide an economic boost in 
the short term, since it is not covered by the sanctions regime. 29 Indeed, tourism is seen as a 
loophole in the sanctions regime, although the US could seek to close it if Pyongyang resumes 
its nuclear weapons testing programme.
Regardless of the short-term vagaries of US–North Korea relations, it is likely that at some 
point, Washington and Pyongyang will sign an agreement, sanctions pressure on North Korea 
will decrease, and the Kim regime will be in a position to implement a long-term tourism 
strategy. By then, North Korea should have also re-opened its borders following their closure 
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The question is thus whether North Korea has a proper 
strategy and whether it could attract large numbers of tourists from China, other East Asian 
countries, and the rest of the world. This is the focus of this chapter.
North Korea’s tourism strategy 
Pyongyang has a clear strategy to boost tourist numbers, which it has been pursuing since 
the early years of Kim’s time in power. The attractiveness of tourism as a revenue-generating 
sector is clear. To begin with, it would raise much-needed cash. Tourism would also help reduce 
economic dependence on China. Also, tourism need not have a negative impact on regime 
stability. Examples of other authoritarian regimes opening up their countries to tourism while 
still holding a firm grasp on power abound. 30 These include China, Myanmar and Vietnam in 
East Asia. In short, opening up the country to tourism should be a no-brainer for the Kim regime.
28  Irujo, J. M., ‘El mensajero de Corea del Norte’ (‘The messenger from North Korea’), El Pais, 28 February 2014. 
Available at: https://elpais.com/politica/2014/02/28/actualidad/1393616374_049521.html, last visited: 11 December 2020.
29  Lee, W., ‘김정은위원장은왜금강산시설철거를지시했나?’ (‘Why Did Chairman Kim Jong Un Order the Removal of Tourist 
Facilities at Mt. Geumgang?’), Korea Institute for National Unification Online Series, CO 19-23, 31 October 2019, available 
at: https://www.kinu.or.kr/www/jsp/prg/api/dlVE.jsp?menuIdx=645&category=72&thisPage=1&searchField= 
author&searchText=Lee&biblioId=1527263, last visited: 11 December 2020.
30  Pacheco Pardo, R., ‘North Korea: Northeast Asia’s new tourism hub?’, 38 North, 4 September 2014, available 
at: https://www.38north.org/2014/09/ramonpp090414/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
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What does North Korea’s tourism strategy consist of? To begin with, and most logically, 
Pyongyang is developing the country’s tourism infrastructure as the first pillar of the strategy. 
This includes hotels, entertainment amenities, sport complexes and medical facilities. 31 Tourism 
infrastructure development also includes a recently launched tourist resort in the highly 
symbolic and China-bordering Mount Paektu, 32 the Yangdok Hot Spring Cultural Recreation 
Centre, 33 the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, 34 the Masik Pass Ski Resort next to the 
tourist coastal town of Wonsan, 35 and the proposed redevelopment of the Mount Kumgang 
Tourist Region near South Korea. 36 In other words, the Kim regime is developing the necessary 
infrastructure and resorts that any country bent on attracting large numbers of tourists would 
focus on.
Furthermore, in December 2019, North Korea’s official media announced that Pyongyang 
would also be targeting the highly lucrative medical tourism sector. The Kim Government 
launched the Treatment Tourism Exchange Corporation to operate health clinics located near 
hot springs. 37 Attempts to attract medical tourists would fit with the strategy of any country 
seeking to diversify the type of visitors it attracts. For example, South Korea and Thailand are 
well-known for leisure tourism but also attract large numbers of medical tourists. In the case 
of North Korea, China is the obvious target for inbound medical tourism.
Training tourism sector professionals is another pillar of North Korea’s tourism strategy. Kim 
launched the Pyongyang Tourism College in April 2014. 38 Training activities include lessons by 
foreign volunteers who can teach English or tourism management. 39 North Korean media claims 
that the college’s activities include participation in tourism fairs, exchanges with international 
institutions, and research. 40 Personnel training is essential for any would-be tourism hotspot, 
and North Korea is no exception. 
Sharing expertise with UNWTO is a third pillar of Pyongyang’s tourism strategy. UNWTO 
focuses on market knowledge, the development of competitive and sustainable tourism policies 
and instruments, education and training, and technical assistance. 41 Since the opening of its 
embassy in Madrid, North Korean officials have regularly interacted with UNWTO experts.42 
31  Pacheco Pardo, R., ‘North Korea: Northeast Asia’s new tourism hub?’, 38 North, 4 September 2014, available 
at: https://www.38north.org/2014/09/ramonpp090414/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
32  Lee, C., ‘North Korea’s Kim opens huge mountain development’, Agence France-Presse, 12 December 2019, 
available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20191203-north-korea-s-kim-opens-huge-mountain-development, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
33  Associated Press, ‘Would you stay in a North Korean spa resort? Kim Jong-un opens a new mountain ski and hot 
spring retreat in bid to lure tourists’, South China Morning Post, 13 December 2019, available at: https://www.scmp.com/ 
magazines/style/luxury/article/3041946/would-you-stay-north-korean-spa-resort-kim-jong-un-opens-new, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
34  Korea Herald/Asia News Network, ‘Kim Jong Un focuses on developing Wonsan tourism zone’, The Strait Times, 
21 June 2018, available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/kim-jong-un-focuses-on-developing-wonsan- 
tourism-zone, last visited: 11 December 2020.
35  Cha, F. and Hancocks, P., ‘World’s most exotic luxury ski resort? Hitting the slopes at Masik, North Korea’, CNN, 
14 February 2014, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/north-korea-ski-resort-gallery/index.html, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
36  Lee, C., op.cit.
37  Shin, H., ‘North Korea to launch medical tourism, targeting visitors from China’, Reuters, 6 December 2019, available 
at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-tourism/north-korea-to-launch-medical-tourism-targeting-visitors-from-
china-idUKKBN1YA0WA, last visited: 11 December 2020. 
38  Pacheco Pardo, R., op.cit.
39  Shearlaw, M., ‘North Korea seeks foreign volunteers to teach tourism students’, The Guardian, 22 January 2015, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/22/-sp-volunteers-teach-tourism-north-korea, last visited: 11 December 2020.
40  Jong, H.S., ‘College trains tourism personnel’, Pyongyang Times, 18 November 2018, available at: 
http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=27251, last visited: 11 December 2020.
41 UNWTO, ‘About UNWTO’, available at: https://www.unwto.org/who-we-are, last visited: 3 March 2020.
42 Pacheco Pardo, R., op.cit.
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This did not stop even after Spain expelled the North Korean ambassador in 2017 and the 
embassy suffered an assault in 2019. Regular engagement with UNWTO experts is useful for 
helping the Kim regime learn about the latest developments in the tourism sector worldwide.
North Korea can continue to develop its tourism strategy under the existing sanctions regime 
in place as of 2020, since sanctions do not cover this sector. What is more, the Donald Trump 
administration reportedly even suggested offering support to help North Korea develop its 
tourism sector, including the Wonsan-Kalma tourist zone. 43 The COVID-19 pandemic has 
temporarily put a brake on tourism into North Korea. And the change in government could mean 
that the US rescinds its offer to provide support for the development of the tourism sector. But 
it seems that at least some in the US – and by extension the international community – sees 
Kim’s push to develop the North Korean tourism sector as a potential area for cooperation.
Build it and they will come? Foreign tourism in North Korea 
Can North Korea become a tourism hotspot? Building the necessary infrastructure, training 
the right professionals, and engaging with the main UN tourism body make for a clear strategy. 
But they do not guarantee that tourists will come. After all, North Korea is not the only country 
seeking to attract leisure and other type of tourists. In East Asia alone, North Korea faces 
competition from an ever-growing number of countries that see tourism as an engine for 
economic growth.
The good news for the Kim regime is, above all, North Korea’s geographical location. According 
to the UNWTO, Asia and the Pacific – a region encompassing East Asia – has seen the fastest 
growth in international tourist arrivals and tourism receipts in recent years. The Northeast Asia 
sub-region has been key to this growth, with China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau and South Korea 
all being bright spots. Tourism in Southeast Asia has also boomed in recent years according 
to the UNWTO. And Chinese, Japanese and South Korean tourists are amongst the biggest 
spenders in the world. 44 In other words, an open North Korea would be in a perfect location 
to attract international tourists. This matters for a low-income country with a population only 
slightly above 25 million, which therefore cannot rely on domestic tourists to boost this sector.
The case of Myanmar is illustrative in this regard. An authoritarian, closed country for 
decades, tourism boomed following a tentative opening-up process from 2010. Tourist arrivals 
increased from 790,000 in 2010 to a peak of 4,680,000 in 2015. Although international tourist 
numbers went down following the Rohingya refugee crisis, 45 Myanmar still recorded 3,551,000 
international tourist arrivals in 2018. International tourism receipts thus rose from US$72 million 
in 2010 to US$1.9 billion in 2017. 46 Myanmar quickly attracted investment from infrastructure 
and tourism firms across East Asia, as well as growing numbers of tourists from the region.47 
Even though the comparison between Myanmar and North Korea is not straightforward, 
considering their different geographical locations, levels of openness, sanction regimes and 
cultural and other tourist attractions, the point is that countries across East Asia can quickly 
attract large numbers of tourists if they open up.
The case of Chinese tourism to North Korea shows that this has already started to happen. 
Reliable figures are not available, but the improvement in Sino–North Korean ties following 
43  Park, J., ‘美, 스톡홀름 협상 때 北에 ‘원산ㆍ갈마’ 개발 청사진 내놨다’ (‘The US issued a blueprint for the development of 
Wonsan-Kalma to North Korea during Stockholm negotiations’), Hankook Ilbo, 19 October 2019, available at: 
https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201910181544097543.
44  UNWTO, International Tourism Highlights, 2019 Edition (Madrid: UNWTO, 2019).
45  Park, K.B., Pacheco Pardo, R., Kim, E. and Ernst, M., ‘Injuries in the DPRK: The looming epidemic’, KF-VUB Korea Chair and 
Harvard Medical School – Program in Global Surgery and Social Change, 2019.
46  UNWTO, op.cit.
47  Park et al., op.cit.
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the deterioration in relations of 2017 meant that by 2019, hundreds of thousands of Chinese 
tourists were visiting North Korea annually. There are even reports that local tour operators 
were struggling to cope with the huge increase in demand from Chinese tourists before the 
COVID-19 pandemic struck. 48 In particular, the number of tourists arriving by trains and buses 
across the Sino–North Korean border was booming pre-2020. 49 Tour packages for Chinese 
tourists were on offer, 50 and should resume once the worst of the pandemic is over. Considering 
the size of China’s population and its geographical proximity to North Korea, attracting even 
a small share of China’s annual outbound tourism means millions of US dollars for the North 
Korean economy.
South Korean tourists would be another obvious target for Pyongyang. Tourism from South 
Korea essentially came to a halt following the closure of the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region 
in 2008, after a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by North Korean soldiers. In his 2020 
New Year Address, however, President Moon Jae-in stated that his government would like to 
resume inter-Korean tourism. 51 Tourism is an obvious choice for Seoul when seeking ways to 
promote inter-Korean cooperation without breaching sanctions on North Korea. Up to 1.93 
million South Korean tourists visited Mount Kumgang while it was open between 1998 and 
2008. 52 This shows that there is potential demand in South Korea to visit North Korea.
Tourism from the rest of East Asia and beyond would be an added bonus. It is not difficult 
to imagine interest from Japanese and Southeast Asian tourists. Especially if a trip to North 
Korea could be combined with, for example, a visit to South Korea or to China’s Eastern coast. 
Indeed, in the early 2010s, the Kim regime started to offer visa-free travel to Malaysian and 
Singaporean nationals to entice tourists from these two countries. 53 In any case, only around 
4,000 non-Chinese travellers visit North Korea annually. 54 Numbers would surely increase 
were the political situation different, as the example of Myanmar demonstrates. But Chinese 
and, potentially, South Korean tourism would dwarf tourist arrivals from other countries.
Conclusion 
Tourism is a promising economic growth engine for Pyongyang. If the economic development 
half of byungjin is to succeed, Pyongyang will need to develop several sectors at the same time. 
With the current sanctions regime on North Korea affecting most sectors of (legal) economic 
activity but not tourism, it makes sense for the Kim regime to prioritise its development. But, 
as explained above, tourism is also part of Pyongyang’s long-term economic strategy.
In this respect, tourism is low-hanging fruit. North Korea already has a well-developed strategy. 
The Kim regime is building the necessary tourism infrastructure. It has been training tourism 
sector professionals for years. The country continues to learn from and cooperate with the 
UNWTO. It has already reaped the rewards of improved relations with Beijing in the form of 
48  O’Carroll, C., ‘As Chinese tourism to North Korea soars, local operators feel the strain’, NK News, 31 October 2019, 
available at: https://www.nknews.org/2019/10/as-chinese-tourism-to-north-korea-soars-local-operators-feel-the-strain/, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
49  Jang, S.G, ‘Has thriving Chinese tourism emboldened North Korea?’ Daily NK, 28 October 2019, available at: 
https://www.dailynk.com/english/has-thriving-chinese-tourism-emboldened-north-korea/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
50  Kim, S.I., ‘North Korean tour package targets Chinese tourists’, Daily NK, 27 August 2018, available at: 
https://www.dailynk.com/english/photo-north-korean-tour-package-targets-chinese-tourists/, last visited: 11 December 2020. 
51  Moon, J.-i., ‘확실한 변화, 새로운 100년을 시작합니다’ (‘Positive change, start a new 100 years’), 7 January 2020, available at: 
https://www1.president.go.kr/articles/7946.
52  Ahn, J.S., ‘N. Korea must create the right conditions for foreign tourists’, Daily NK, 7 November 2019, available at: 
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-must-create-right-conditions-foreign-tourists/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
53 Pacheco Pardo, R., op.cit.
54  Crabtree, J., ‘North Korea is attracting thousands of vacationers every year. So who are they?’, CNBC, 25 July 2017, 
available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/north-korea-vacations-heres-whos-visiting-the-dictatorship.html, 
last visited: 11 December 2020.
RECONSTRUCTING NORTH KOREA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
23
booming tourism from China. Its past experience with inter-Korean tourism shows that there 
is untapped demand from South Korea. The example of Myanmar shows that demand from 
elsewhere in East Asia, and potentially beyond, could follow if the country opened up.
Therefore, we should expect the Kim regime to continue to prioritise tourism as a growth 
engine once the COVID-19 pandemic is over and for the foreseeable future. Without a new 
nuclear test – or perhaps an intercontinental ballistic missile test – tourism will continue to be 
outside the scope of UN sanctions. Pyongyang can therefore build on the preparations it has 
been making to boost this sector in recent years. Even without the tourism boom that could 
follow an opening up process, Chinese visitors can provide an economic boost to the North 
Korean economy. With a real opening up process, the example of Myanmar could apply to 
North Korea.
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5. North Korean Healthcare and its Importance in Rebuilding the Economy
By Dr Catherine Jones 55
Lecturer, University of St Andrews 
Free universal healthcare in North Korea was enshrined in the constitution of 1972 in Articles 
18–27. Previously, it was enunciated in 1946 in the social insurance law, in 1952 in the law on 
basic healthcare, and in 1960 under the universal healthcare act. 56 This commitment not only 
to provision but to quality provision has also been reaffirmed in the speeches of Kim Jong-un, 
including in his 2019 New Year’s speech where he stated the need to fulfil commitments in 
healthcare “to modernise pharmaceutical and medical device factories and refurbish hospitals 
and clinics”. 57 Despite these legal commitments and the intention that UN sanctions will not 
have detrimental effects for the wider population, “North Koreans received better medical 
care under Kim Il-sung than they do these days”. 58 A further key point is that under current 
conditions, the healthcare system, although nominally available to all, is segregated between 
the wealthy and the poor in terms of both access and quality of care. 
This developing picture has three important takeaway points for this project: 
 (1)  The health situation of the wider North Korean population is decreasing. The result is 
that diseases (including tuberculosis (TB), malaria, hepatitis B and HIV) and longer-
term health problems (including malnutrition from the famine in the 1990s) will 
increase the costs of rebuilding the economy whilst also reducing the potential size 
of the workforce. 
 (2)  Healthcare is becoming a key element of the internal economy and reinforces existing 
hierarchies. As a result, this provides a pre-existing platform to rebuild the economy, 
but may also enhance the livelihoods of the elites which may undermine or adjust the 
effectiveness of sanctions. 
 (3)  The range of healthcare challenges that are emerging and increasing also needs to 
be viewed in relation to the types of medicines and vaccines that are needed and 
how these provisions interact with other aspects of the sanctions and economic 
architecture (in particular the provision of energy for refrigeration). A further aspect 
here is how doctors and medical professionals are trained and how this will make 
rebuilding the provision easier.
Current healthcare situation 
Although it is very difficult and challenging to determine the current healthcare situation in 
North Korea, a number of resources and data sources – when taken collectively – can provide 
a composite picture of the situation. 
The first of these resources is from the World Health Organization (WHO), which publishes 
data on TB reporting rates for new and reoccurring cases, on the provision of vaccination and 
treatment, and on the funding of TB and HIV programmes. For many of these data sets, the 
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WHO has incomplete data which fails to provide a sufficiently detailed analysis of the spread 
of either TB or HIV, and the current data stops at 2015. 59 Hence, in seeking to understand the 
situation in North Korea, it is essential to triangulate many data resources. Supplementing 
the WHO data with other resources, including the activities and inputs of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in the country, can add to the picture of the current healthcare situation. 
For NGOs, rather than tracing infections and treated people, it is easier to trace the inputs 
of medicines, vaccines, and treatment centres, all of which indicate levels of usage of NGO-
supported healthcare. It is also important to note that the withdrawal or reduction of provision 
is a vital indicator of declining access to vaccines and resources. For this data, this report 
draws on the information of two NGOs – the Global Fund and the Eugene Bell Foundation – 
both of which have been allowed access to North Korea to provide vaccines and medicine. 
Using the resources and data from these two NGOs and their tuberculosis financing 
programmes, and by positioning incomplete WHO data within the context of the reasonable 
reliability of NGO inputs, the general trend is towards an increase in cases of drug-resistant 
TB infections and an increasing gap in funding for the DPRK TB programme. 60 A key aspect 
of the data is the significant cut to the funding of the TB programme by the Global Fund 
in 2018. 61 It is important to note that this was not because these resources were surplus 
to requirements, but the result of concerns that the funding could be ‘misappropriated’. 62 
However, in September 2019, the board of Global Fund announced a new wave of funding 
for the North Korea TB programme – which was agreed with Pyongyang in January 2020. 63 
This example demonstrates both the need for humanitarian aid and assistance to support the 
health needs of the population, and also the limitations and fluctuations of this support. 
Other entities that could cover and mitigate this dip in funding include the Eugene Bell 
Foundation, although it only has 12 treatment centres across North Korea. 64 The Foundation 
has been allowed to extend its coverage in the country and the engagement is developing. 
However, an interview with Dr Stephen Linton of the Foundation notes that there have been 
sanctions-related problems in building treatment centres, particularly because of the stringent 
interpretation of the sanctions by both the DPRK and the PRC, although these particular 
treatment centres have now been given a specific exemption by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). 65
These two examples demonstrate ongoing issues with the intersection of humanitarian aid 
and political and security issues. A further example of this is in the provision and refrigeration 
59  WHO, ‘Global Health Observatory country views: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea statistics summary 
(2002 – present)’, available at: http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-PRK, last visited 28 February 2020.
60  WHO, ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Tuberculosis Finance profile’, available at: https://extranet.who.int/sree/
Reports?op=Replet&name=%2FWHO_HQ_Reports%2FG2%2FPROD%2FEXT%2FTBFinancingCountryProfile&ISO2= 
KP&outtype=html, last visited 28 February 2020. 
61  This is noted in the above reporting. See also, Spezza, G. and Zaldeh-Cummings, N., ‘North Korea’s silent health crisis’, 
The New Humanitarian, 25 February 2019, available at: http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/02/25/north-
korea-s-silent-health-crisis, last visited: 11 December 2020. 
62  Hotham, O., ‘Global Fund board approves $41.7 million grant for North Korea TB-malaria work’, NKNews, 20 September 2019, 
available at: https://www.nknews.org/2019/09/global-fund-board-approves-41-7-million-grant-for-north-korea-tb-malaria-
work/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
63  Hotham, O., ‘North Korea, Global Fund reach agreement on new TB-malaria treatment grant’, NKNews, 24 January 2020, 
available at: https://www.nknews.org/2020/01/north-korea-global-fund-reach-agreement-on-new-tb-malaria-treatment-
grant/, last visited: 11 December 2020.
64  Spezza, G and Zaldeh-Cummings, N., ‘North Korea’s silent health crisis’.
65  Airirang News, ‘TB crisis in North Korea “emergency situation”: One-on-one with Stephen Linton’, 30 November 2018, 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmfR97EsNcQ, last visited: 11 December 2020, 2:35-4:00mins. For details of 
the exemption approval and the types of humanitarian provision that can be exempted see: United Nations Security Council, 
‘Humanitarian Exemption Requests’, available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/
humanitarian-exemption-requests, last visited 28 February 2020. 
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of medicines. This requires energy, but this has become a specific target of the UN sanctions 
against the regime and it is almost impossible to isolate energy for humanitarian purposes.
A key problem here for the rebuilding of the economy is that the aid that is provided – and 
now specified in the UNSC exemption – is emergency aid to prevent immediate loss of life. 
However, in rebuilding the economy, the type of aid that is required – for example in building 
and equipping hospitals, and supporting healthy lifestyles and healthcare – is developmental, 
which is treading a fine line for inclusion as ‘assistance activities’ in the sanctions listing. 
Healthcare provision and training 
A key question in the provision of healthcare in North Korea is how and where doctors and 
other professionals are trained and under what conditions they provide healthcare. These 
questions are essential for understanding the scale of the rebuilding project in this area. 
As with other topic areas, details in this area are particularly ad-hoc and information is largely 
compiled from interviews with leavers or personnel operating in the country in the area 
of healthcare, or from Chinese academics – such as Wang Xingxing and Zheng Jiyong 66 – 
conducting research in North Korea. From these sources, it is clear that the majority of North 
Korean doctors are trained in North Korea at training centres including the Pyongyang Medical 
College and the Hamhung Medical College. However, for specialist or advanced training – for 
example, to train in working with children with disabilities – a limited number of doctors travel 
overseas. 67 Other sources, including Professor Yoon Seok-jun from Korea University College of 
Medicine, have indicated that training for nurses can be completed online in North Korea, and 
that the different levels of training across the range of healthcare professions could present 
a barrier for unification. 68 Similarly for this project, different levels of healthcare expertise 
may present challenges for rapidly providing consistent quality healthcare, and also when 
delivering and prescribing drugs that are new to a number of North Korean doctors. As a result, 
when looking to rebuild the economy, there would need to be a specific programme of further 
training or continuing professional development for the North Korean healthcare system. This 
could be aided but also impeded by the range and types of NGO aid and assistance that 
already exist – appropriately stocktaking the existing skill levels, aid and assistance so that 
consistent coverage and appropriate resources can be achieved would be essential.
That is not to say there are not benefits to the North Korean system. Although North Korean 
doctors are often working with fewer resources and limited access to testing, one source 
has claimed that this makes their treatments more “dexterous” and their consultations 
longer as they have to try and discover ailments and find treatments through talking to the 
patient. 69 Similarly, the local provision of allocating at least one doctor per geographical sector 
is a formula that could be expanded and further utilised in rapidly developing the provision in 
North Korea. 
Healthcare and rebuilding the economy 
In seeking to focus on the relationship between healthcare and the economy, there are a 
number of considerations. As noted above, there is the distinction between aid provided to 
66  Zheng, J. and Wang, X., ‘North Korea’s non-traditional security and China’ in Jones, C. and Teitt, S. (eds), China–North Korea: 
Between Development and Security (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2020).
67  Ignis Community, ‘IGNIS help train NK doctors’, 23 March 2019, available at: 
https://igniscommunity.org/p-updates/2019/8/15/ignis-help-train-nk-doctors, last visited: 11 December 2020.
68  Sung-sun, K., ‘Different medical training may impede inter-Korean healthcare cooperation’, Korea Biomedical Review, 
5 November 2018, available at: http://www.koreabiomed.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=4483, last visited: 27 March 2020. 
69  Chu, M., ‘What is healthcare like up north?’, Korea Biomedical Review, 12 December 2017, available at: 
http://www.koreabiomed.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2103, last visited: 27 March 2020. 
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reduce immediate threats to life and developmental aid. Being unable to provide developmental 
assistance will increase the costs for rebuilding the economy. 
However, a further – and possibly more significant – consideration is the intersection of UN 
sanctions and healthcare despite the livelihood and humanitarian exemptions. This is illuminated 
by articles indicating that healthcare is becoming an element in the informal economy, and 
particularly that it is a commodity for elites and relates to issues of whether healthcare is being 
misappropriated. It also raises questions over the provision and use of energy in North Korea. 
As noted by a North Korean defector, 70 and by news reports on North Korea, 71 healthcare – 
despite the legislation detailed above – is differentiated according to people’s ability to pay or 
their position in society. 72 Within these reports, it is noted that the best hospitals are reserved for 
the elites and the quality of care experienced depends on the price paid, seemingly reinforcing 
the social hierarchies. Despite this, it is worth noting that a vehicle accident involving Chinese 
tourists revealed the poor condition of even the best hospitals. As Zheng and Wang note: 
“Kim Jong-un himself was ignorant about the actual state of medical treatments in the ‘best 
hospitals’ of North Korea. He became very dissatisfied when he found out about the poor 
capacity of North Korean hospitals to treat Chinese victims of a well-known traffic accident in 
April 2018 (Lo, 2018) – a vivid case highlighting the poor medical conditions present in North 
Korea (a CCTV video was also embedded in the South China Morning Post article).” 73 Hence, 
even though these reports indicate that the consistent quality of universal healthcare is being 
undermined by a commercial driver, even the highest provision still has significant problems in 
responding to significant and acute conditions. 
A second element to consider here is the development and making of medicines within North 
Korea. As noted at the outset, North Korea does have a pharmaceutical industry that Kim Jong-
un has highlighted. However, a report from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs 
(KIHASA) notes that, increasingly, the medicines made are those with a higher profit margin 
– for example Viagra – rather than those widely needed for survival. 74 Similarly, within North 
Korea, nationally made medicines are seen as the lowest quality, Chinese-made pharmaceuticals 
are desirable but less so than those made in South Korea, Japan and the US. Hence, there is a 
platform to make pharmaceuticals, but investment would be needed in order to develop the 
most-needed drugs at appropriate quality. 75
A final element is the need to develop continuing professional development programmes 
for all healthcare providers, to ensure consistency in treatment across all the North Korean 
provinces, and to provide training in processes and drugs that may be new in some or all of 
those areas. 
Conclusion 
Overall, this brief report has indicated that despite the legal provisions, quality healthcare 
is not consistently provided within North Korea. External support to address TB and other 
infectious diseases can fluctuate significantly in response to the political situation. Healthcare is 
increasingly becoming a part of the informal economy and reinforces existing social hierarchies. 
70  Shim, T., ‘Ask a North Korean: what is the healthcare system in the DPRK really like?’ NKNews.
71  Radio Free Asia, ‘In North Korea, regular folks can see Kim Jong Un’s doctor for the right price’, Radio Free Asia, 2 May 2019, 
available at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-hospital-bribe-05022019160213.html, last visited: 11 December 2020. 
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In relation to the restructuring of the economy, this presents significant opportunities and 
challenges. The major opportunity is through the potential the informal economy has to 
undermine the regime – an issue that has become an increasing concern for the regime. A major 
challenge, however, is that the population working in manual and heavy labour industries – 
which are significant contributors to the economy within North Korea and a crucial component 
of the overseas workforce – have little ability to access healthcare and are also vulnerable to 
the effects of famine from the 1990s (the current workforce were children during the famine 
and have lingering effects such as stunted growth). These elements are likely to affect the 
economic performance of North Korea currently, but could also become a crucial factor when 
considering how the economy could develop a healthy workforce in the future. 
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6. Conclusion: Prospects for North Korea’s Economic Liberalisation 
By Mr Craig Tiedman
Director of Policy & Research, Henry Jackson Society 
In the aftermath of World War II, liberal democracies and like-minded states sought to advance 
the ideals of free markets and liberal trade regimes globally in order to effectively counter the 
spread of communism. In the immediate post-War era, some developing states and those that 
became newly independent states rejected communism, while others developed as hybrid 
authoritarian states with controlled economic systems. 
The Cold War institutionalised Soviet-style Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) within 
communist states including China, Vietnam and North Korea. In the aftermath of the Korean 
War from 1950-1953, North Korea became increasingly isolated from the global political and 
economic order and retreated into itself as a ‘hermit kingdom’ relying largely on China for 
trade and connections with other states within the Eastern Bloc. 
In 1991 the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a domino effect with other Eastern Bloc countries 
and one-by-one former communist regimes in Eastern Europe evolved from communism. 
Liberal democracies claimed a symbolic victory and in 1992, academic Francis Fukuyama 
famously asserted that the model of liberal democracies and the free market system signalled 
the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural evolution. 76 
North Korea lost its traditional Eastern Bloc trading partners during this time period and the 
North Korean economy, as Dr Tat Yan Kong explains, collapsed under the weight of a series of 
natural disasters and structural weaknesses leading to famine and hardships. Unlike China and 
Vietnam, North Korea – under Kim Jong-il’s leadership – failed to take advantage of hybrid 
economic opportunities and engage more with the West. Instead, Kim Jong-il instituted the 
Songun Policy (‘military first’) choosing to take a more aggressive stance against the rules-
based order and focus its budget on building its military at the expense of its economy. North 
Korea, predictably, did not follow China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
and it remained entrenched in a closed economy paradigm.
Reconstruction 
In the 21st century, military interventions with the goal of regime change in states such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been amplified as costly and largely ineffective means by which 
to not only enable regime change but also to convert under-developed states into market 
economies. Regime change by force is a highly unlikely model if applied to North Korea and 
so normalisation of relations between the West and the DPRK is the only possibility for some 
sort of ‘reconstruction’ of the North Korean economy to take place.
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the Henry Jackson Society convened a group 
of prominent experts in 2019 to discuss ideas for reconstructing North Korea’s economy in the 
aftermath of the Kim-Trump summits. The idea was to bring experts together to brainstorm 
over what a North Korean economy and integration into the global economic and political 
worlds would resemble if the DPRK and liberal democracies were to normalise relations. We 
are thankful for the Korea Foundation’s support in allowing us to put our thoughts down in 
writing and examine and identify particular areas of DPRK’s sectors where reconstruction 
would have the most success in the initial stages. 
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Dr Tat Yan Kong examined North Korea’s historical economic trajectory in his paper and 
argued that the weaknesses of the Soviet-style CPE economic model were revealed when 
North Korea’s economy nearly collapsed in the 1990s resulting in hardship and famine. Dr Kong 
highlighted North Korea’s paradox of being an urbanised country with a relatively low income 
per capita and explained how the DPRK has become dependent on the market since the late 
1990s but has struggled. Dr Kong views the DPRK’s steady march to excessive militarisation 
as another cause of the country’s economic backwardness and a key area to be addressed for 
the country to be able to grow its economy. 
Dr Adam Cathcart explored North Korea’s necessary experimentation with the market, 
especially the through Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) and building cross-border trade 
relationships with China. While progress has been made, particularly in the area bordering 
China, economic development remains limited by suppression on both sides of the border and 
poor North Korean transport links.
Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo focused his contribution on exploring the prospects of potential 
growth in North Korea’s tourism and hospitality sector. This had been, he argues, one of 
Kim Jong-un’s key initiatives as this particular sector has not been targeted by sanctions. 
Moreover, the steady growth of tourism in Asia means that the country could replicate the 
previous success in tourism that Myanmar enjoyed before that country’s Rohingya refugee 
crisis impacted growth. He also points to an untapped potential for South Korean tourist visits 
but recognises that good relations will have to be maintained between North and South Korea. 
Finally, Dr Catherine Jones wrote about the state of North Korea’s healthcare system and 
noted the difference in North Korea’s constitutional claim of free universal healthcare with 
reality. She argued that not only does its system all too often fail to deliver but also that it 
currently delivers a substantially worse service to the country’s poor. She notes the effects 
of sanctions and highlights the need for a healthy workforce for future economic growth. 
Nevertheless, Dr Jones notes that Kim Jong-un has made the healthcare sector one of the 
country’s top priorities although North Korea will continue to need external support to address 
outbreaks of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases, and therefore the regime must build 
relationships externally.
Conclusion 
Arguably the most significant influences on our original assessment of North Korea when we 
framed it in terms of reconstruction in key sectors was to include the spread of the COVID-19 
virus into a global pandemic and the defeat of President Trump in the US Presidential Election 
of November 2020. The DPRK’s response to the pandemic was to severely restrict travel across 
its borders beginning as early as January 2020 and thereby revert to the international isolation 
for which the regime has been known since the late 1940s. The DPRK regime has claimed that 
its efforts to protect the country from the COVID-19 virus has been successful and has resulted 
in no cases of any its citizens to have caught the virus since January 2020.
Undoubtedly, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the North Korean 
economy and may affect DPRK moves towards normalisation of relations with the ROK and 
the United States. Some believe that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will 
include a reordering of global power among the international community and only strengthen 
North Korea’s largest trading partner, China, in the global order. 
Whether or not North Korea will be amenable to a newly enhanced 2021 ‘Moonshine Policy’ 
remains to be seen, however, the silver lining of the pandemic may be that the DPRK has no 
choice but to seek normalised relations with the West. The DPRK’s relations with a new US 
administration in 2021 and beyond will also be critical to prospects of reconstructing North 
Korea’s economy in a healthy and globally connected economy.
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